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On 11 January 1995, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
agreed to hear a complaint against Great Britain by three gay men imprisoned 
for sado-masochistic sexual practices in the infamous "Operation Spanner" 
case.l This international hearing addressed the vital question, "If a man wants 
his scrotum sandpapered in the privacy of his own home, is it anybody else's 
business?" The complaint to the Court arose after the United Kingdom had 
sentenced sixteen men to prison for engaging in consensual sado-masochistic 
sexual activities; specifically, among other things, "nailing each other's willies 
to the skirting b ~ a r d . " ~  The men were convicted on assault charges; the case 
was unusual in that the evidence against them was a set of videotapes of the 
activity rather than the testimony of any victim. Since the activity itself was 
entirely consensual, there was no complaining witness in any of the cases.4 
The Commission eventually rejected the men's complaint, ruling that the 
state has the right to interfere in the private lives of its citizens "to protect pub- 
lic health and  moral^."^ One commentator called the day of the Commission's 
decision "a black day for human rights in Europe," arguing that the 
Commission's Judge Pettiti "displays a contempt for individual freedom unri- 
valled even by the Thought Police in Orwell's 1984."6 Underlying such con- 
demnations of the Commission's judgment is an insistence that the government 
stay out of the affairs of consenting adults. It is presumed by critics that the 
state should not interfere with the consensual sexual activities of individuals, 
no matter how bizarre such activities might seem to  other^.^ Because the men 
involved consented to the activities they engaged in, it is argued, any physical 
harm sustained by the participants should be deemed no more injurious to 
"public health and morals" than similar injuries that might occur during a par- 
ticularly vigorous boxing match or a mountain climb. 
This essay is an attempt to understand the discursive apparatus surround- 
ing sexual consent in the broader context of the history of the Anglo-American 
juridico-legal repression of sexuality. The goal of this essay is to make a few 
observations about the production of erotic subjectivities through juridico-legal 
discursive ma~hinery.~ I have chosen a rather circuitous route to this goal. 
Rather than approaching the problem systematically in order to arrive at final 
conclusions, I have chosen to analyze a cluster of events in Anglo-American 
juridico-legal history in order to tease out some of the implications of the way 
in which certain assumptions about "consent" circumscribe erotic identities. 
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Underlying this methodology is an understanding of the role of historical 
scholarship as not just an interested recording and re-telling of events but also 
as a performative act in its own right. My choice of case studies is by no means 
canonical and may even seem haphazard. I have chosen these cases themati- 
cally rather than systematically. The project of laying out an exhaustive histo- 
ry of the discursive apparatus at work here is beyond the scope of this essay. 
My goal instead is to get at certain themes in the treatment of "consent" with 
an eye toward the role of the legal system in producing erotic subjectivities. 
While I am in part attempting to bring to light a hidden history of the relation- 
ship between sexuality and the law, my main purpose is not to provide an 
exhaustive or even authoritative version of this history, but rather to choose 
historical incidents in which the questions of consent that I am trying to under- 
stand are evoked most expli~itly.~ 
In looking at the framing of consent in various cases, including those 
where sadomasochistic sexual practices are at issue, one finds seemingly par- 
adoxical inconsistencies. It is my contention that such inconsistencies are 
actually different facets of a coherent discursive formation; that is, products of 
an underlying power dynamic that produces subjects as erotic identities. 
Rethinking Consent and Assault: The S/M Cases 
On 10 April 1976, 107 members of the Los Angeles Police Department 
swarmed over a Hollywood bathhouse to arrest 40 men (after detaining 80) for 
violating an 1899 California law against slavery.1° The men arrested were par- 
ticipating in a mock slave auction as a fund-raising benefit for gay organiza- 
tions. LAPD officials had been preparing the raid for several months before- 
hand, and when the raid went down, they brought the media with them. 
Between 5:20 AM and 5:40 AM the morning after the raid, "Capt. Wilson, the 
field commander for the operation, had given interviews to 3 radio stations and 
one print journalist."ll Val Martin, the "slave auctioneer" at the benefit, 
recalls: 
a very groovy guy comes to me with a leather jacket and a 
leather cap, tom jeans, very good looking. And he comes to 
me and asks what is the price of these slaves, so I told him. 
. . . He asked me if he (the slave) was a good cocksucker; I 
said 'sure' and he said, "Well, I have a big dick, do you think 
that he can suck my big dick?'So I said, "Sure, as a matter 
of fact they call him 'Jaws."' I was just kidding around.. .. 
as soon as I said "sold" and received the money from him, 
the whole thing comes down. He gives a signal to the rest of 
the police and a couple of helicopters, three or four TV cam- 
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eras, and 120 policemen surrounded the premises, even on 
top of it.I2 
The entire cost to the City of Los Angeles of the raid was conservatively esti- 
mated at $150,000. The day after the raid, the Orange County Register S front- 
page headline screamed, "Police Free Gay Slaves." The paradoxical impro- 
priety of this sentence, its irony seemingly lost on the paper's editors, was 
characteristic of the LAPD's and the prosecutor's version of the events of the 
raid; the Pasadena Star News, for example, quoted one police officer as say- 
ing, "we went in and liberated them."13 Of course, this "liberation" involved 
handcuffing the defendants, forcing them to kneel or lie face down, then cart- 
ing them in a crowded bus to jail for processing, denying them the opportuni- 
ty to use the toilet, and taunting and photographing them at the police station.14 
The headline that the editors of the Register constructed to describe the 
raid is not only ironic; it also falls into the category of catachresis: an abuse of 
language. Gayatri Spivak has noted that such abuses can be intellectually pro- 
ductive.15 In her essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?' Spivak looked briefly at 
the sentence that Freud constructed from his female patients' accounts of 
masochistic sexual fantasies: "A child is being beaten."16 Freud's sentence is 
catachrestic in that the isomorphic analogy suggested between subject-forma- 
tion and collective behavior is overly simplistic, but it is productive in that it 
allows her to highlight the fact that the sentence predicates a history of repres- 
sion with a doubled origin. I think the obviously catachrestic sentence "police 
free gay slaves" allows for a similarly productive reading. In the case of 
Freud's sentence, the doubled origin of repression is both in the amnesia of the 
infant and in the archaic past (assuming the useful fiction of a moment in 
human history prior to and outside of the history of sexuality). The sentence 
assembled by the edtors of the Orange County Register predicates a history of 
repression with two origins as well: one in the specific circumstances sur- 
rounding the Mark IV Raid and the other in the history of the relationship 
between the law, consent, and "sexual perversion".17 
Michel Foucault has shown how varieties of the "sexual pervert" were 
constructed in medical and juridical discourse during the Victorian era. For 
Foucault, the "perverse" sexualities that were recorded and categorized during 
the Victorian era were not ahistorical personality traits that existed prior to 
their recording. Rather, they were produced and consolidated as such through 
this discursive process. This is not to say that the discourse of power "creat- 
ed" perversion but rather that it made certain that each perversion had a name, 
a trajectory, a personality, and a detailed account of itself.18 He focuses on cer- 
tain themes in the discourse of power and pleasure in order to get at some of 
the implications of what he calls the "perverse implantation". "Modern socie- 
ty is perverse," he writes, "not in spite of its puritanism or as if from a back- 
lash provoked by its hypocrisy; it is in actual fact, and directly, perverse."19 
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According to Foucault, power functions not by repression primarily, but 
rather by the discursive production of sexual identities. This does not, of 
course, mean that sexuality is not repressed in Western cultures. As Gayle 
Rubin argues in "Thinking Sex," Foucault's analysis of the repression hypoth- 
esis in volume one of the History of Sexuality does not deny the existence of 
political repression of sexuality in Western societies.20 In fact, Western histo- 
ry is rife with instances of sexual repression induced by moral panic. What 
Foucault does is point out that repression is not the only or even the primary 
function of power. The exercise of power as repression takes place in service 
to power's primary function, which is productive. Power produces sexual 
identities in a positive, rather than exclusively negative, manner. 
We see this argument about the nature and h c t i o n  of power at work in 
Foucault's analysis of sexuality, as well as in his histories of madness, disease, 
and the prison system. In lectures at the CollGge de France in 1975 which laid 
some of the groundwork for History of Sexuality, he illustrated this concept in 
relation to the history of disease, specifically in the transition he notices from 
the model of leprosy to the model of the plague, calling it "the invention of pos- 
itive technologies of power": 
The reaction to leprosy is a negative reaction; it is a reaction 
of rejection, exclusion, and so on. The reaction to plagues is 
a positive reaction; it is a reaction of inclusion, observation, 
the formation of knowledge, the multiplication of effects of 
power on the basis of the accumulation of observations and 
knowledge. We pass from a technology of power that drives 
out, excludes, banishes, marginalizes, and represses, to a 
fundamentally positive power that fashions, observes, 
knows, and multiplies itself on the basis of its own effeck2' 
This dynamic is precisely what is at work in the history of sexual perversion: 
we have moved from the exercise of power as repression, exclusion, banish- 
ment, to the exercise of power as production through the refinement of a disci- 
plinary discourse. Foucault argues in History of Sexuality that when it comes 
to the relation of power to sexuality, what is at work is not so much "a nega- 
tive mechanism of exclusion" but rather "the operation of a subtle network of 
discourses, special knowledges, pleasures, and powers." He continues: 
At issue is not a movement to push rude sex back into some 
obscure and inaccessible region, but on the contrary, a 
process that spreads it over the surface of things and bodies, 
arouses it, draws it out and bids it speak, implants it in real- 
ity and enjoins it to tell the truth: an entire glittering sexual 
array, reflected in a myriad of discourses, the obstination of 
powers, and the interplay of knowledge and pleasure.22 
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The sexual pervert in the Victorian era is not "repressed" in the sense of being 
banished or rendered invisible; rather, she  is rendered visible by a discourse 
that makes that visibility a locus of control. 
It is clear that the Mark IV Raid, like the Spanner case in England, repre- 
sents a significant historical moment in the more recent history of the perverse 
implantation. The figure of the "gay slave" mobilized in the discourse sur- 
rounding these events has historical significance as a conduit of power and 
resistance in specific historical circumstances, rather than simply as a mani- 
festation of the sadomasochist studied by Krafft-Ebing or Reik. 
It is well known that throughout the 1990s, conservatives in the United 
States went to great extremes to demonize the movement for anti-discrimina- 
tion laws for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals by associating the "gay agenda" 
with the abuse of children and with disease and moral decay.23 This moral 
panic24 included nationwide attempts to repeal or declare illegal any mention 
of sexuality in anti-discrimination statutes and perhaps revealed itself at its 
most ludicrous in the resignation of Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders over 
(among other things) a comment about ma~turbation.~~ 
In particular, fimdamentalist pundits appropriated exaggerated representa- 
tions of sadomasochism and the leather communities from gay pride parades 
and used these images to vilify gay men, lesbian, and bisexuals as "perverts" 
and "freaks." The film The Gay Agenda, for example, which was mass-pro- 
duced for popular audiences and hand-delivered to political representatives, 
extensively used images from the leather community as a rhetorical tool to 
demonize the gay community as perverse and unworthy of civil rights.26 Anti- 
gay activists chose the most exaggerated images of S/M sex they could find in 
order to demonize the entire gay community (and, by extension, anyone who 
would advocate an understanding of homosexual behavior as socially accept- 
able). 
What is striking about this appropriation is not that it has been successful 
in its aim of synecdochically demonizing the gay community at large. In fact, 
it backfired dramatically from that perspective, as evidenced by the increasing 
cultural and social presence of positive images of the gay community coupled 
with a decreased tolerance for open attacks on gays in the form of violence or 
police hara~sment .~~ And the iconography of this sort of "perversity" - whips, 
collars, cuffs, leather clothing, etc. -has become a distinct facet of mainstream 
popular culture. 
Rubin argues that moral panics of this type should be read as the "'politi- 
cal moment' of sex, in which diffuse attitudes are channeled into political 
action and from there into social change." She continues: 
Because sexuality in Western societies is so mystified, the 
wars over it are often fought at oblique angles, aimed at 
phony targets, conducted with misplaced passions, and are 
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highly, intensely symbolic. Sexual activities often function 
as signifiers for personal and social apprehensions to which 
they have no intrinsic connection. During a moral panic, 
such fears attach to some unfortunate sexual activity or pop- 
ulation. The media become ablaze with indignation, the pub- 
lic behaves like a rabid mob, the police are activated, and the 
state enacts new laws and regulations. When the furor has 
passed, some innocent erotic group has been decimated, and 
the state has extended its power into new areas of erotic 
behaviorZ8 
In the Mark IV case, what was on trial was not the violation of the laws against 
slavery or pandering (which the Mark IV prosecution had reduced the charges 
to after the District Attorney refused to degrade his office further by continu- 
ing to prosecute absurd charges of "slavery"), but rather the sexuality of the 
accused.29 As defense attorney Thomas Hunter Russell argued in the Mark IV 
trial, "what is really on trial here is the sexual orientation of the defendants, and 
not their specific behavior with regard to a particular section of the Penal 
Code."30 
Interestingly, while the Mark IV case was prosecuted as a pandering case, 
charges of assault were never brought against the defendants for any sado- 
masochistic acts that may have taken place at the auction. The question of con- 
sent was raised only indirectly through the symbol of the "gay slave" awaiting 
"liberation" by police. The prosecution in the Spanner case, however, focused 
primarily on such charges, regardless of Lord Mustill's protest that the case 
should be about "private sexual relations". It is worth briefly examining the 
discussion of this case in the House of Lords because the arguments surround- 
ing the issue of consent are made explicitly. 
For Lord Templeman, who found with the 3-2 majority in Regina v. 
Brown, there is no question of raising a "consent" defense to the assault 
charges. The sadomasochistic activities participated in by the defendants are 
part of a "cult of violence" that society is both "entitled and bound to protect 
itself against." He continues, "Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is 
an evil thing. Cruelty is un~ivilised."~~ Lord Templeman is careful to argue 
that sadomasochistic sexual practices injure society as well as the specific "vic- 
tim"; thus, the consent of the victim does not legalize conduct that would oth- 
erwise be regarded as assault. 
Lord Jauncy went even fiuther, arguing that society must be protected not 
only from a general "cult of violence" but from the more specific social dan- 
ger of sadomasochistic recruiting. While the defendants were never charged 
with crimes specifically for videotaping their activities, Lord Jauncy argues 
that such taping was in no way innocent: 
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Furthermore, the possibility of proselytisation and corrup- 
tion of young men is a real danger even in the case of these 
appellants and the taking of video recordings of such activi- 
ties suggests that secrecy may not be as strict as the appel- 
lants claimed to your Lordships. If the only purpose of the 
activity is the sexual gratification of one or both of the par- 
ticipants what then is the need of a video recording?32 
The majority in Regina v. Brown dealt with the issue of consent by empha- 
sizing the immoral purpose at work in sadomasochistic activities. If someone 
is injured during a game of rugby, his or her consent would invalidate any 
assault charges that might arise from the injuries. The difference between this 
hypothetical example and the behavior at issue in Brown is the difference 
"between violence which is incidental and violence which is inflicted for the 
indulgence of cruelty." In organized sports, Lord Templeman continued, the 
"danger to life and limb is merely incidental to the main purpose of the activ- 
 it^.''^^ 
In an article in the Texas Journal of Woman and the Law, Monica Pa crit- 
icizes the judgment in Brown, arguing that the Lords' decision legalizes dis- 
crimination specifically against homosexual S/M sexual practices. While Lord 
Templeman declared himself unprepared "to invent a defence of consent for 
sado-masochistic encounters which breed and glorify cruelty," Pa points out 
that what the court actually did instead was invent a new crime. The 1861 law 
(Offenses Against the Persons Act) that was used to convict the defendants 
"clearly intended to penalize conduct of a quite different nature," as Lord 
Mustill put it in his dissenting opinion. For Pa, the decision is a manifestation 
of the Lords' homophobia. "All three Lords in the majority," she points out, 
"recognized the comfort they received from knowing that one of the younger 
participants, K., 'has now settled into a normal heterosexual relati~nship'."~~ 
And a later case, Regina v. Wilson, in which the court held that a wife's con- 
sent to having her husband's initials branded on her buttocks was a legitimate 
defense against an assault charge, suggests that, as Sangeetha Chandra- 
Shekeran points out, "despite the conception of S/M sex as violence, acts 
involving similar 'violence' within an authorized heterosexual relationship are 
not subject to the same level of public interferen~e."~~ 
Although the cases are very different, at stake in both the Mark IV and the 
Spanner cases is a moral rejection of the sexuality of the defendants. Pa under- 
lines this point with reference to the "unusually severe" sentences imposed by 
courts in such cases. In Brown the defendants received sentences of up to four 
and a half years. The Mark IV defendants were threatened with five-to-ten 
year sentences, which were eventually plea-bargained to much shorter terms. 
Other cases have seen more serious sentences, in many cases far exceeding the 
typical sentences given for nonconsensual rape or assault.36 In such cases it 
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becomes clear that the defendants' sexuality, and not just specific illegal activ- 
ities, is what is on trial. 
Rethinking Consensual Sodomy: Lawrence v. Texas 
In order to better understand the role played by consent in the Anglo-American 
legal imaginary, it is worth briefly looking at the treatment of consensual 
homosexual sodomy that is not related to S/M activities. Once illegal in many 
US states, homosexual activity has been given the stamp of approval of the 
highest court in the land. The court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas over- 
turned its infamous 1986 decision upholding the constitutionality of state 
sodomy laws.37 The decision has been hailed as a constitutional victory by gay 
rights activists and civil libertarians alike. Bruce Steele characterized the deci- 
sion in The Advocate as a victory for sexual liberation: "The historic magnitude 
of the US Supreme Court's Lawrence v. Texas decision, invalidating all remain- 
ing US sodomy laws, is equal to that of the Stonewall uprising. It will resonate 
for decades."38 The decision was equally passionately vilified by its critics. In 
a vitriolic dissent, Justice Scalia called the decision "a product of a law-pro- 
fession culture that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agen- 
da."39 Scalia predicted a "massive disruption of the current social order" in a 
classic instance of the "slippery slope" argument: grant constitutional protec- 
tion to sodomy, he warned, and you must be prepared to grant such protection 
to everything from gay marriage to be~t ia l i ty .~~ Scalia noted: 
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, 
and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of 
Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every 
single one of these laws is called into question by today's 
decision.. . .41 
Of course, the slippery slope metaphor is a relatively obvious logical fal- 
lacy, not the least because of the arbitrariness of any decision regarding where 
the slope begins to slip.42 But it is worth focusing momentarily on Scalia's 
rationale, which turns on the question of moral choice, and ultimately, an indi- 
vidual's right to engage in consensual sexual activity. Scalia's feeling is that 
the core significance of Bowers is the "validation of laws based on moral 
choices." At issue, from Scalia's perspective, is a state's right to make its own 
choices regarding individual morality. Of course, from the perspective of the 
court's majority, it is the question of the individual's right to make his or her 
own choices regarding individual morality that is at stake.43 Justice Kennedy 
spelled this out clearly in his majority opinion, emphasizing the important role 
of consent in distinguishing between behavior that would be protected by the 
Constitution and behavior that would not: 
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The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated 
in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.. . . 
The case does involve two adults who, with fill and mutual 
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices com- 
mon to a homosexual lifestyle.44 
The obstacle that prevents us from sliding down the slippery slope, for 
Kennedy, is consent; constitutional protection is not expected to be extended to 
behavior that is nonconsensual. For Kennedy, homosexual activity deserves 
constitutional protection because it involves private behavior by consenting 
individuals. Of course, many supporters of sodomy statutes reject this argu- 
ment quite explicitly, and state that individual consensual private behavior is 
not protected by the Constitution. 
Scalia, however, seems to carefully avoid making such rejection explicit 
in his dissent. He rarely mentions the word and never addresses the consent 
issue directly, and he only mentions "privacy" twice. He insists, like Justice 
White did in Bowers v. Hardwick, on narrowing the constitutional issue at stake 
to the question of whether there is a "fundamental right" to engage in homo- 
sexual sodomy. Justice Thomas, in his brief rejoinder to Scalia, is at least more 
forthright in his rejection of the notion that there is a constitutional right to pri- 
vacy at 
The difference between Kennedy and Scalia over the question of consent 
highlights the problem in the Anglo-American legal tradition that the present 
study attempts to understand. While it is clear that Kennedy's opinion holds 
that consent of the individuals involved makes the liberty to engage in conduct 
a constitutionally protected liberty, it is not clear whether Kennedy would be 
willing to extend that logic to the kind of behavior at issue in such cases as 
Regina v. Brown. In societies which are clearly liberalizing their views 
towards consensual sexual activity, what precisely constitutes "consent" in 
terms of sexual activity? When can the law agree that a person has consented 
to sexual activity? What lines should be drawn between private sexual activi- 
ty and activity that is considered assault? Ready answers to such questions do 
not present themselves. 
I will return to the implications of the Spanner and Mark IV incidents 
below. I would like to first address another cluster of incidents in British and 
American juridico-legal history that speak to this problematic. These cases are 
rape and assault cases whose narratives involve sadomasochistic  character^.^^ 
But there are three important differences in the following narratives: the 
"sadomasochists" are heterosexual, the "sadomasochists" are women, and the 
"sadomasochists" are prosecuting witnesses rather than defendants. While I 
think that both interesting and fruitful analyses of these clusters of cases might 
examine the first two differences, teasing out the implications of these cases in 
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terms of sexuality and gender, my focus here on the role of consent leads in the 
direction of the third. 
Consent and Coercion: The Rape Cases 
I know I had sex with her without consent. I know what I 
have done is wrong. I don't like myself. I've lost all my 
friends except those close to me. 
- Rape Defendant Ben E m e r ~ o n ~ ~  
Despite this frank confession, Ben Emerson was awarded a verdict of "not 
guilty" of rape on 29 November 1994, after a two-minute jury deliberation at 
Leicester Crown Court. The judge commented to the jury, "I wholeheartedly 
agree with your verdict." The judge had actually recommended to the jury that 
it render a quick decision before even hearing the defense's case: 
At the end of the prosecution case the judge summarized the 
alleged victim's evidence and reminded the jury how she and 
Emerson had oral sex without her objecting at her home . . . 
the judge told the jury: "When he went to get some baby oil 
to massage her body, what is this young man to think when 
he finds in the drawer artificial penises, magazines designed 
to excite sexually? He finds a riding crop near her bed and 
chains on the bed."48 
After the trial, a friend of Emerson stated, "Justice was served in the end."49 
"Justice," in this case, meant the release of a self-identified rapist because 
the "alleged" victim had committed the prior crime of being a pervert. There 
can be no doubt from the evidence that what was really on trial during this 
event was the prosecution witness's sexuality - the mere existence of an inter- 
est in kinky sex made her charge of rape untenable. A woman's right to say 
"no" to sex is here circumscribed by the discursive apparatus invoked by her 
sexuality - a woman with an interest in sadomasochism, rubber skirts, and 
body-piercing, judge and jury seem to have reasoned, cannot be raped. Her 
sexuality implicitly predisposes her to consent to sex - she is inscribed as 
always-already willing. 
On 8 November 1978, an Ohio appellate court handed down a similar ver- 
dict to two men accused of rape, felonious assault, and felonious sexual pene- 
tration. The court included a detailed description of the events of 14 July 1977 
in the court transcript, providing an account of victim Jane Lucas' testimony 
"[alt the risk of memorializing the conduct of the Defendants for the future 
delight of the sexually perverse."50 This invocation of a notion of potential 
prurient interest in the testimony of the victim is characteristic of this court's 
treatment of the issues involved in this case - outright violence is sexualized 
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and treated as potentially "nonserious" in the serious context of the court- 
room.51 
According to Lucas' testimony, she drove to Donald Kekich's apartment 
with the intention of having sex with him. When they got there, Kekich told 
her to undress and asked if she needed to use the bathroom. In the bathroom, 
she was grabbed by a naked man (Howard Phillips, another of the defendants), 
raped, and severely beaten. Kekich and Phillips continued to rape and beat her 
for hours, later taking her to the apartment of other friends who joined in her 
torture, which lasted all night and included being threatened with a shotgun, 
which was then shoved inside of her while pictures were taken. 
The defendants were convicted of "felonious sexual penetration", but 
were acquitted of rape and assault on the basis of the discursive apparatus 
mobilized by the following testimony: "She asked for everything. She asked 
to blow you, she asked to go to bed with you. I mean, every sex act that hap- 
pened was through her. I mean came out of her mouth and with each and every 
The appellate court vacated convictions on rape and assault charges 
based on testimony from a friend of Lucas' that she had overheard Lucas 
express masochistic fantasies, and the following birthday card sent by Lucas to 
Kekich, with whom she had a sexual relationship prior to the assault: 
I think you're a brute, an animal and a Sex Fiend! 
- And I want you to know I appreciate it! 
Happy Birthday! 
To a man who won't stand anything he doesn't like, do with- 
out anything he desires, or even be polite to people unless 
they please him. 
As mean as you are - you will live a century & then some - 
Happy Birthday, Turkey! 
Love, 
Janie Lucas 
According to the appellate court: 
It is evident in the instant case that Jane Lucas who accom- 
panied Donald Kekich, Bruce Battista, Harold Phillips and 
Daniel Phillips initially by invitation got much more than she 
bargained for. However, it is equally obvious from evidence 
of record and especially from the birthday card admitted as 
Defendants' exhibit, supra, that had acts which followed 
been limited to sexual conduct it would not have been nec- 
essary to compel Jane Lucas to submit by force or threat of 
force and that no charges would have been filed with noth- 
ing further being heard of such occurrences. 
Here the mere suggestion that Ms. Lucas might have consented without force 
to a sado-masochistic sexual relationship is taken as apriori evidence that she 
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cannot legally be raped. Again, her sexuality inscribes her as always-already 
willing. The appellate court's conviction of the defendants on charges of "felo- 
nious sexual penetration" further indicates that, at least in the eyes of Ohio law, 
what went wrong on 14 July 1977, was not so much the violence and terror to 
which Ms. Lucas was subjected, but rather the introduction of a foreign object 
into one of her orifices - the defendants, in other words, were convicted of vio- 
lating a dildo l a ~ . ~ ~  
In such cases, the "sadomasochist" is seen as having given up hler rights 
to protection from violence or abuse. While both cases involve heterosexual 
women, homosexual men as prosecution witnesses have faced similar difficul- 
ties in credibility. In August of 1993, an appellate court released a man con- 
victed of murder because the murder victim had written a long sadomasochis- 
tic sexual fantasy in his journal and the trial court had refused this journal entry 
as evidence at trial. The fantasy is reproduced for the delight of the court in its 
entirety in the published case. The unspoken implication of the court's deci- 
sion is that a man who fantasizes about homosexual sadomasochism has some- 
how consented to a brutal murder. The court found the journal entry "essential 
to the appellant's defense": 
It suggested Craven may have desired to be involved, and 
may have been involved in voluntary sadomasochist sex 
when he was killed. If he suffered from these desires, then he 
might have sought out an amenable partner.54 
This "amenable partner", it seems, killed him. Again, the law has constituted 
the sadomasochist as an always-already willing victim, even to the point of 
death. 
This opinion also highlights the idea of "voluntary sadomasochistic sex" 
as a "desire" that one "suffers from", a common thread in much of this dis- 
course. The official status of "perverse" desire is thus situated as a medical and 
psychiatric condition that places those "afflicted" beyond the protection of the 
law and unworthy of inclusion in "civilized" society. Ironically, this same 
argument is also used to discount the stated consent of S/M practitioners in 
cases where there is no complaining victim. Monica Pa notes the rhetorical 
function of such "pop psychology" diagnoses: 
This presumed mental depravity of the "victim" by courts 
infantilizes, ostracizes, and derides the intelligence and 
agency of S/M participants. It is a rhetorical strategy, rather 
than a genuine attempt at psychological prognosis. This rhet- 
oric regards S / M  participants presumptively irrational, and 
thus, not capable of a legally-cognizable response. As a 
result, "since few judges or jurors can imagine why anyone 
would do S M ,  it is easy to obtain convictions and brutal sen- 
tences." Moreover, categorizing S M  sex as simply "crazy" 
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abnegates the duty to consider these issues in a judicious and 
complex manner.55 
Legal scholar Cheryl Hanna cites a number of other rape and sexual 
assault cases in which the complaining victim "was someone whom a jury 
could have found deserving of a beating, or at least not worthy of the protec- 
tion of the law."56 State v Collier, for example, dealt with a pimp who raped 
and beat one of his prostitutes. The victim "was a prostitute and a drug addict, 
and arguably sexually deviant by the nature of her profe~sion."~~ In that case 
the court would not allow consent as a defense. But such a defense was not 
precluded in the more recent case of People v. Jovanovic, in which the New 
York Court of Appeals let stand a decision allowing the defendant to produce 
evidence that the complaining witness sought an S/M relationship with him.58 
In that case the victim, a college student, admitted to having consented to some 
S / M  activities with Jovanovic, but testified that Jovanovic continued with the 
activities long after she withdrew her consent. According to the victim, 
Jovanovic tortured her for twenty hours, refusing to respond to the "safe word" 
that they had negotiated before the encounter. During this time he hog-tied her, 
poured wax on her body, inserted batons in her rectum, choked her, and threat- 
ened to kill her. While the court held in a footnote that "[tlhere is no available 
defense of consent on the charge of assault," it nevertheless found that the trial 
court erred by not admitting into evidence emails indicating the victim's inter- 
est in sadomaso~hism.~~ 
In a recent and widely publicized case in Orange County, the son of an 
Assistant Sheriff was accused of participating in the videotaped gang rape of 
an unconscious sixteen-year-old girl.60 The defendant, Gregory Haidl, was 
able to get a mistrial based on the defense that the victim consented to the sex 
and the videotaping. The jury in the case found itself "hopelessly deadlocked", 
with only one juror voting to convict. Despite the videotape of the sexual 
activity, one juror described his reluctance to convict by stressing that "the evi- 
dence was real weak.. .. There was too much he-said, she-said."61 While the 
Haidl case did not focus explicitly on sadomasochism, the "perverse" nature of 
the complainant's sexual desire was the cornerstone of the defense's strategy. 
The case illustrates the power of the rhetorical kamework of consent described 
here. 
According to press reports, the video, which was confiscated by police: 
begins with [Jane] Doe saying she felt "so fucked up" and 
resisting Haidl's attempt to remove her top .... Filming 
resumed eight minutes later with the defendants using Doe - 
now naked and unconscious - for sex on a garage sofa and 
pool table. Later on the video, they can be seen laughing, 
dancing and mugging for the camera as they penetrate the 
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girl's vagina and anus with a Snapple bottle, juice can, light- 
ed cigarette and pool cue.62 
When the video was discovered and police found the victim, she could remem- 
ber none of the sexual activities of the night. The defendants were charged 
with drugging her and gang-raping her for the video. 
At trial, defense attorney Joseph G. Cavallo called Doe "a 'slut' who 
'craved' gang-bang sex, was 'proud' of her promiscuity, dreamed of becoming 
a porn star and actually directed the sexual encounter with the defendants while 
she 'feigned' unconsciousne~s."~~ Another defense attorney argued that there 
was "consent from beginning to end, from start to finish."64 The theory sup- 
ported by the defense was that it was Doe, rather than Haidl, who initiated the 
events, and that despite the drugs in her system she was faking unconscious- 
ness in order to l l f i l l  her dream of starring in a "prearranged, necrophilia- 
themed p o r n ~ . " ~ ~  Reporter Scott Moxley, who covered the case extensively for 
the Orange County Weekly, noted that the defense strategy in the case depend- 
ed upon them trying to "convince at least one of 12 Orange County jurors that 
men aren't responsible for sex when they think an unconscious, underage girl 
really, really wants it."66 In fact, they were able to convince eleven of them. 
In each of the above cases, the court legitimized a defense of "consent" as 
used against complaining victims of sexual and physical assault. Yet in 
Spanner and similar cases,67 the court overruled this defense where there is no 
complaining victim. The implication common to both sets of circumstances is 
that the public image of the "sadomasochist" as established by legal and psy- 
chiatric tradition will be imposed upon the "victim" even where there is no 
identz9able complainant whofalls into this category. Where there is a victim, 
h/er voice will be silenced and replaced by this public image. S h e  will be 
stripped of the legal privilege to say "no" to unwanted sexual attention, assault, 
kidnapping, and even murder. And where there is no victim, this public image 
will create a hypothetical victim who is then stripped of the mental or emo- 
tional capacity to say "yes". 
The irony here is that juridico-legal traditions are willing to impute con- 
sent to someone who claims not to have granted consent, while those same tra- 
ditions are unwilling to recognize consent when the "victim" claims to have 
granted it. These traditions hold that a crime has occurred when there is no 
complaining victim, yet when there is a complaining victim these same tradi- 
tions will declare, over h/er objections, that she  was asking for it. In either 
case the "pervert" is presumed to be incapable of knowing his or her own sub- 
jectivity. 
This presumption of ignorance - and not just ignorance but of the lack of 
the very capacity to know oneself - is a common theme in many of these cases. 
In the 1967 assault case People v. Samuels, for example, a California appellate 
court convicted the defendant on the basis of a film of him whipping another 
Police Free Gay Slaves 69 
man. Samuels raised a consent defense which was rejected on the argument 
that it was not possible for a defendant to consent to the kind of behavior wit- 
nessed on the film. "[Clonsent of the victim," the court held, "is not general- 
ly a defense to assault or battery, except in a situation involving ordinary phys- 
ical contact or blows incident to sports such as football, boxing or wrestling." 
The court continued, "It is a matter of common knowledge that a normal per- 
son in full possession of his mental faculties does not freely consent to the use, 
upon himself, of force likely to produce great bodily injury."68 Gayle Rubin 
has criticized this case, looking at the implications of this logic: 
[Alnyone who would consent to a whipping would be pre- 
sumed non compos mentis and legally incapable of consent- 
ing. SiM sex generally involves a much lower level of force 
than the average football game, and results in far fewer 
injuries than most sports. But the court ruled that football 
players are sane, whereas masochists are not.69 
Here, as elsewhere, the "pervert" is presumed to be legally incapable of con- 
sent. This presumption has profound implications for subjectivity. The voice- 
consciousness of the subject is effaced by the legal logic at work. 
This logic is laid out even more explicitly in a more recent case in 
Massachusetts. Alden Baker of Middlesex was charged in 2001 with being a 
"Sexually Dangerous Person" (SDP) for practicing S/M with consenting part- 
ners. The state SDP law calls for involuntary imprisonment of people who 
"suffer from a 'mental abnormality' that makes them likely to commit future 
sex offenses." The jury heard expert testimony, some of which claimed that 
the mere participation in consensual S/M activities rendered the defendant 
"clinically deviant."'O The jury eventually found that the Commonwealth had 
not met its burden of proof, and released the defendant.71 While Baker thus 
avoided prison, the way in which the question of "mental abnormality" was 
raised suggests that the figure of the "gay slave" as incapable of consent still 
animates contemporary legal discourse. 
Consent and Erotic Subjectivity: Concluding Thoughts 
Early on in this essay, I suggested a bifurcated psychoanalytic reading of the 
sentence "police free gay slaves". Like Freud's sentence "a child is being beat- 
en," the sentence produced by the Orange County Register has a dual origin: 
one in the specific circumstances of the Mark IV raid (or any such event), and 
the other in the larger discursive formation that is produced through the histo- 
ry of the relationship between law, sexuality, and consent. One might argue 
more generally that the relationship here is between the discursive formation 
and the constitution of an individual (perverted) subjectivity. 
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In the Mark IV incident, the figure of the "gay slave" to be "freed by 
police is mobilized to speak in the place of actual participants in the events 
under public scrutiny. A strict interpretation of this figure calls to mind the 
photographs the LAPD made available to the Associated Press after the raid - 
Val Martin, in the interview cited above, recalls that during the raid the police 
had chosen for arrest 
the ones who were the most outrageous, because everyone 
who was in jail with me were, like, in leather chaps and noth- 
ing else, the rest of the body was nude. You know, pierced 
tits, chains, really the way we really dress for an evening like 
that. 
Martin stressed the performative nature of the figure at work here, whereas the 
police and media representations take the figure quite literally, characterizing 
the "sadomasochist" as one who enjoys and deserves hler political repression, 
whether it operates through legal or extralegal machanisms, and even to the 
point of death.72 This figure is recognizable more broadly as a marginal but 
visible figure in popular culture (witness the popularity of movies like The 
Secretary, Pulp Fiction, and Body of Evidence) and in psychiatry and psycho- 
analysis (see, for example, Krafft-Ebing's meticulously documented case his- 
tories) as well as in law and politics. 
This implies a rhetorical understanding of the trope of the "gay slave" or, 
more generally, the sadomasochistic "pervert." Obviously, the monolithic 
nature of this trope tells us nothing about the actual sexual practices and roles 
involved in leather and S/M sexual identities. The rich diversity of sexualities 
potentially encompassed by this category is flattened out by the popular image 
of the "gay slave." While the figure as mobilized in the Mark IV raid was gen- 
dered male, I would suggest that the more general figure at work in this dis- 
course is not gendered male or female per se, but is more precisely gendered 
as always-already in drag. Like drag, S M  is not just a sexual practice but also 
a mode of performance art. The costumes, the uniforms, the props, the metic- 
ulous attention to setting a stage and following a script, these all point to a con- 
sciousness among participants of the performativity of sadomasochistic sexual 
practices. As Monica Pa notes, "S/M is not so much a 'replay' of violent inter- 
actions as it is a self-consciously transmogrified parody."73 
What is at stake in the mobilization of this trope (and of the more general 
image of the "sadomasochist" to which the trope refers) in the context of the 
Mark IV raid is not so much any particular sexual "identity" as such, but rather 
the unknown and unknowable threat to the public posed by what the trope is 
presumed to represent. The "gay slave" is always "in drag" because s h e  per- 
forms a sexuality that marks something irreducibly other. This irreducible oth- 
erness is always ultimately associated with death. Pat Califia addressed this 
trope as it appears in the book Modern Primitives: 
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There are so many things wrong with this breezy little stereo- 
type that it's hard to know where to begin to deconstruct it.. . . 
[The] linking of power-exchange sex to thanatos is nothing 
but a cliche. Our community is interesting (and powerful) 
precisely because we have chosen to live, to fashion rela- 
tionships, organizations, institutions, traditions, mythology, 
and norms - in spite of all the voices from outside which tell 
us we (a) are obsessed with death and (b) deserve to die.74 
Although Califia speaks here to a very different context for the use of this fig- 
ure, its characteristics differ little from those mobilized in the juridico-legal 
realm discussed above. In spite of ubiquitous evidence that the "sado- 
masochist" engages in often complex and multifaceted rituals of staging sexu- 
ality - and that these rituals hold various meanings for different participants - 
the dominant social discourse must incessantly reduce these meanings to a rela- 
tionship with death that is both descriptive and normative. This relationship 
has substantive political implications for the ways in which sexuality is treated 
in a given society. The assumed relation between sadomasochism and death 
gives way to another assumption, also spelled out by Califia: 
we must enjoy being oppressed and mistreated. We like to 
wear uniforms? Then we must get off on having cops bust 
up our bars. We like to play with whips and nipple clamps 
and hot wax? Then it must turn us on when gangs of kids 
hunt us down, harass and beat us. We're not really human. 
We're just a bunch of leather jackets and spike heels, a bunch 
of post office boxes at the ends of sex ads.75 
The exercise of power (whether it be the legitimized power of the state or the 
illicit power of extralegal repressions such as police harassment, queer-bash- 
ing, and public humiliation) against the "sadomasochist" is here legitimized as 
something inevitable, necessary, and even "enjoyable" to the objects of such 
power. 
I argued earlier that the sentence "police fiee gay slaves" predicates a his- 
tory of repression. Most of the above analysis has been directed at one aspect 
of that history, the discursive history of the relationship of the law to "sado- 
masochism." What have been repressed throughout this discursive history are 
the specific mechanisms by which the erotic subjectivity I have perhaps over- 
simplistically designated by the name "gay slave" is produced by a dominant 
discourse. Another aspect of the history of repression predicated in the sen- 
tence is of course the set of material events surrounding the Mark IV raid, and 
indeed, the specific nature of any such event. Materially, the "freedom" police 
provided the "gay slaves" involved handcuffing them, arresting them, photo- 
graphing them, taunting them, subjecting them to verbal abuse, denying them 
the right to use the toilet, then forcing them through a long and expensive pub- 
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licized legal process which ruined many families and careers. This trope, then, 
is primarily a vehicle for the exercise of power. In order for that power to be 
effectively exercised, it is essential that the sadomasochist keep quiet. The 
decision to say "yes" or "no" to sexual activity is one best left up to judge and 
jury rather than participant. 
Finally, I think it important to add that events such as Spanner and the 
Mark IV raid also helped alter the meaning of the trope of the "gay slave" in 
public discourse in progressive ways.76 Foucault's notion of resistance as "the 
odd term in relations of power"77 is particularly relevant here; Foucault writes: 
"Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines 
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it."78 Foucault 
shows how the production of discourse about perversity in general and homo- 
sexuality in particular produced a whole array of mechanisms of social control 
and domination. At the same time, however, the introduction of this category 
of personality 
made possible the formulation of a 'reverse' discourse: 
homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand 
that its legitimacy or 'naturality' be acknowledged, often in 
the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it 
was medically di~qualif ied.~~ 
Similarly, I would argue that the production of the category of the "gay slave" 
in Los Angeles in 1976 helped allow this figure to begin to speak on its own 
behalf. The Mark IV incident was, in fact, a political disaster for the LAPD. 
"Gay" and "straight" publics alike saw the raid as a waste of precious resources 
that should have been spent fighting real crime.80 As if to dramatize the sense 
of public priorities that was affronted by the LAPD's overzealous actions, a 
woman was mugged and murdered just ten blocks fiom the Mark IV while the 
raid was going on.81 One hundred and seven cops to bust a charity ball but not 
a single one to save a woman's life - needless to say, this image did not play 
well to a California public that had just passed a gay rights ordinance but was 
jittery about street crime. The District and City Attorneys immediately disso- 
ciated themselves from the LAPD's position until the prosecution dropped the 
ridiculous "slavery" charges, and the City received hundreds of letters fiom the 
public protesting the raid.82 
The raid and its aftermath have been compared to the Stonewall riots 
because "we learned how to cope with it, fight back, stand up for our rights".83 
While Stonewall stands as the privileged figure of gay resistance in history, the 
Mark IV Slave Auction constitutes a less visible historical moment. It is a 
moment in which the struggle over the meaning to be assigned the trope "gay 
slave" was temporarily won by those most frequently subjected to the power- 
effects of this trope. Martin recalls that after the Mark IV raid: 
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There is more unity; when people began to find out what was 
really going on, what the image of a leather person was, that 
a lot of people had a wrong idea of the leather community. 
When people in the gay community find out what we are 
really like, they change their minds about us. They fuss, of 
course, but we are more respected.84 
This respect was an important outcome of the struggle over the meaning of the 
"gay slave" trope. 
But this respect has come at a price. The Mark IV raid took place during 
a period of frequent attacks by the LAPD against the leather and S/M commu- 
n i t i e ~ , ~ ~  and the negative publicity the LAPD received as a result of the raid did 
not put much of a damper on its use of legal and extralegal means to attack 
leather bars. In one incident just a few months after the Mark IV auction, for 
example, Long Beach police visited another "slave auction" benefit. Over two 
weeks after their visit, the officers arrested three gay men for their participa- 
tion in the auction.86 On Valentine's Day, 1992, eleven LAPD officers raided 
the Dragon House (a "gay sex club") without a warrant and seized the club's 
membership information and money that had been raised to benefit a hospice.87 
In a more recent, and more widely publicized, incident, police in the small 
town of Attleboro, Massachusetts raided a private S N  club that that they were 
surprised to discover right across the street from the police station.88 
Prostitution charges were brought against the owner of the property and a 
woman at the club faced assault charges "for allegedly spanking a woman's 
bare bottom until it bled, using a wooden paddle."89 The response of the fetish 
community to the raid illustrates Foucault's notion of resistance well. The 
police raid was quickly dubbed "Paddleboro" by activists who raised money 
for a legal defense fimd and drew attention to the raid as a discriminatory 
attack against a group of erotic dissidents. The American Civil Liberties Union 
and the National Coalition for Sexual Freedom joined the fight against the 
prosecutions, and the raid was widely criticized in the press. One reporter 
noted that the Paddleboro case was "quickly becoming a smaller version of the 
famous 1969 Stonewall raid in Greenwich Village that sparked the modern gay 
rights movement."90 S N  activists, energized by the public attention to the 
raid, have developed seminars and guidelines to help police understand when 
behavior that appears unusual is part of "safe, sane, and consensual" SA4 activ- 
ity.91 The charges were dropped in 2001 .92 
The Mark IV incident described in this essay is all but forgotten even 
among Los Angeles-area gay activists, and it is rarely mentioned in gay histo- 
ry books.93 Spanner, on the other hand, has had much more visibility, even in 
mainstream European historical analyses. When the Spanner defendants were 
first convicted, a British S/M community rallied to their defense, and outspo- 
ken voices criticized the European Court of Human Rights decision upholding 
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the British courts.94 Commentators attributed to Spanner a "sea change" in 
attitude about fetishism and sadornasochi~m.~~ The legal conclusion of the 
Spanner case was the criminalization of S/M sexual conduct as assault, but the 
social reaction to the case again illustrated the complex relationship between 
power and resistance. Spanner helped bring attention and even social accept- 
ability to S N  practices in Europe. 
The lack of attention among historians to the Mark IV incident is decid- 
edly unfortunate, for, like Spanner, the incident marks a significant turning 
point in the struggles for sexual liberation - not because it loosened juridico- 
legal controls on sexuality directly, but rather because the political fallout from 
the raid set the social stage for public sympathy for gays as victims of harass- 
ment. The idea that consensual sexual activity could be criminalized was 
briefly exposed as legalized harassment. While the harassment would contin- 
ue, the social conditions of its legitimacy had begun to de ter i~ra te .~~ 
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ment of this project. I am also grateful to the editors of Left History for their patient 
editorial guidance. 
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